Legal

ERI files brief in support of Bangladeshi torture victim’s case in the wake of Kiobel

Related Projects: 

On Friday, May 17, 2013, EarthRights International and the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) filed a friend-of-the-court (“amicus”) brief in Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, at the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In 2009, a jury found Worldtel and Amjad Khan liable for torturing Nayeem Mehtab Chowdhury in an effort to obtain control of his business.

Program Area: 

EarthRights Urges Senators to Oppose Srinivasan Nomination and Seek Information on Pro-Corporate Advocacy

Related Projects: 

Concerned by news that the Senate will vote on the confirmation of former corporate defense lawyer Sri Srinivasan’s nomination to a coveted federal appellate judgeship on the D.C. Circuit as early as today, ERI has written a letter to Senators urging them to oppose cloture and the nomination.

Program Area: 

ERI to U.S.: Giving Trade Preferences to Myanmar Can Have Human Rights Consequences

Related Projects: 

Forced labor, land grabs, and other serious abuses are still common in the extractive industries and plantation agriculture sectors in Myanmar (Burma), according to a brief ERI submitted to the U.S. Government on Friday.  In the brief, ERI argued that if the U.S. wants to give trade preferences to Myanmar, it needs to take steps to manage the possibile human rights consequences.

Program Area: 

Calling Out the API’s Lies in Oxfam’s Final Brief to the District Court

Last week, I finished working on the final brief of ERI’s client, Oxfam America, in the District Court lawsuit that the oil industry has filed to overturn landmark transparency legislation, American Petroleum Institute v. SEC.  In this brief, my  co-counsel and I underlined the lies and misleading references that the American Petroleum Institute (API) has spun in order to turn a common-sense, straightforward disclosure rule into a bug-eyed monster.

API’s argument revolves around three main themes.  First, they say it would violate their First Amendment free speech rights if oil companies were forced to publish information on the payments they make to governments.  In other words, they claim that companies have a constitutional right to make secret payments.  This argument is the legal equivalent of “swinging for the fences,” because if the court agrees with API, it could actually overturn the law instead of just invalidating the regulations that the SEC enacted under the law. 

It’s also the legal equivalent of a Hail Mary pass, because the argument is extremely thin.  In order to get there, API has to get the court to see these disclosures as a form of political coercion so that it can enjoy the same protections that political organizers receive when they seek to keep their supporters confidential.  To get First Amendment protection, you have to show that government is somehow controlling or chilling the expressive speech that you want make; it’s hard to see how these disclosures do that.

Of course, businesses can be required to disclose information all the time in the public interest, and it’s not political speech.  If API’s arguments were taken seriously, then the government couldn’t require companies to tell you what’s in the pesticides farmers use or to report to their . . .

Who is indigenous? Peruvian Minister resigns after President says that Quechua-speaking Andean campesinos are not entitled to prior consultation

Over the weekend, the Peruvian Government’s Vice-Minister for Interculturality, Iván Lanegra confirmed that he would resign after he appeared to lose an argument over who is considered “indigenous” and thus protected by a new law in Peru implementing the right to prior consultation.

The dispute emerged over the creation and dissemination of a database (base de datos) which will list all the indigenous communities in Peru covered by the consultation law. The Vice-Minister for Interculturality is the government official responsible for the elaboration of this document.

The Vice-Minister and the entire executive branch have already faced criticism for delays in the publication of the database, for the lack of participation of indigenous communities in the preparation of the document, and for imposing overly-restrictive criteria for what constitutes being “indigenous.”

In retrospect, however, such criticism represents mere brush stroke errors compared to the bucket of paint that the President of the Republic and the Minister for Energy and Mines have just dumped onto the canvas.

According to a recent Reuters article, President Ollanta Humala has adopted the position put forward by Jorge Merino, leader of the Ministry for Energy and Mines, that the only indigenous communities covered by the consultation law should be Amazonian ones, excluding entirely the campesino communities of the Andes. This decision is a thinly veiled effort to facilitate the implementation of resource extraction projects throughout the Andean region, home to vast mineral deposits, without having to go through the inconvenience of consulting the communities whose lives will undoubtedly be hugely affected in the process. Indeed, the Ministry of Energy and Mines has already indicated that 14 projects will be moving forward without prior consultation.

In an attempt to justify this remarkable position, Merino has argued that the Quechua-speaking Andean campesinos should not be considered indigenous because . . .

Trial courts struggle to answer questions left open by the Supreme Court in Kiobel

As Jonathan mentioned in his recent post, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (Shell) left much to be answered as to how courts should handle Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claims arising outside of the United States. In Kiobel the Supreme Court dismissed a case involving foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign conduct. But the Supreme Court didn’t tell lower court judges what to do in cases that do not involve Kiobel’s “foreign cubed” set of facts but do involve claims arising abroad – other than to state that they must “touch and concern” the United States “with sufficient force.”

Friday morning, I attended one of the first hearings in an ATS case since Kiobel and saw firsthand how little guidance the Kiobel decision provides to lower court judges hearing ATS claims that arise outside of the United States—an indication of how little the Supreme Court actually decided in Kiobel. The case was Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology and involves ATS and common law claims against a U.S. military contractor (CACI) for alleged torture and other abuses occurring in Iraqi prisons as a part of a conspiracy with the U.S. government, and resulting from decisions made in Virginia.

During the hearing, district court judge Bruce Lee questioned both defense counsel and plaintiffs’ counsel (Baher Azmy, Legal Director of the Center for Constitutional Rights) about what they understood the Supreme Court to mean when it stated that the principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality should apply to ATS claims arising abroad. The judge also wanted to know what Kiobel’s “touch and concern” standard should be taken to mean. In a somewhat exasperated fashion, Judge Lee exclaimed to plaintiffs’ counsel at one point, “I am a trial court judge . . . and the Court didn’t tell me what . . .

Lower Courts Set to Address Questions Kiobel Left Unanswered

In all the flurry surrounding last month’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, perhaps the clearest takeaway has been that the lower courts have their work cut out for them in applying the Supreme Court’s rule to actual cases where people have suffered abuses like torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, created a new presumption that claims arising out of human rights abuses that occurred abroad are not actionable under the Alien Tort Statute – a presumption that can be overcome in cases that “touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force.” 

We know that “mere corporate presence” of a foreign multinational company in the United States is not sufficient to overcome the new Kiobel presumption, but we also know that only Justices Alito and Thomas believed that all the conduct giving rise to a cause of action must take place on U.S. soil.  There is a broad spectrum of scenarios between the two extremes, and many of them are teed up for briefings in the coming weeks and months.

For example, this Friday, a judge in Virginia will hear arguments on how the Kiobel presumption applies in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, a case involving torture by a U.S. government contractor at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.  According to the plaintiffs:

“Unlike in Kiobel, Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of conduct that occurred in a U.S. occupied territory and detention facility over which the United States had total authority; unlike in Kiobel, Plaintiffs’ claims challenge conduct undertaken by U.S. citizen employees of a U.S. corporation (domiciled in Virginia) in conspiracy with U.S. military personnel in carrying out (unlawfully) interrogations for the United States government and in violation of fundamental U.S. military and legislative prohibitions against torture and

. . .

Legal Victory in the Appellate Courts

D.C. Circuit Dismisses Oil Industry Challenge to Disclosure Rules on Jurisdictional Grounds

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an oil industry challenge to landmark transparency rules today.  In a unanimous decision, the court found that the American Petroleum Institute (API) cannot pursue its case, American Petroleum Institute v. SEC, in the appellate courts as it prefers, and that it is required to proceed in the district court instead.

Program Area: 

Judge: "Chevron's problem is of its own making”

That’s what Judge Kaplan in New York told Chevron today when he refused to allow the company to serve another subpoena on Amazon Watch. The original subpoenas relate to Chevron’s lawsuit in New York against the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and their counsel who won a $19 billion judgment against the oil company in Ecuador in 2011.   

Earlier this month, a judge in California had quashed two sweeping subpoenas issued by Chevron to Amazon Watch, concluding they were “egregiously overbroad” and sought “the heart of Amazon Watch’s expressive activity.” ERI had argued that the subpoenas were a violation of Amazon Watch’s First Amendment rights and an obvious effort by Chevron to harass and intimidate one of its most vocal critics. Although Chevron had urged the court to make a finding that Amazon Watch had engaged in fraudulent conduct, the court found that “all evidence before this Court suggests otherwise[.]”  Rather, “[a]ll that Chevron has shown … is that Amazon Watch has been very critical of Chevron’s operations in Ecuador.”  

Unsatisfied, Chevron went back to Judge Kaplan seeking another bite at the apple. But he wasn’t buying it either. “The essence of Chevron’s problem is of its own making,” he wrote in his order. The law was clear when Chevron served the first subpoena, Judge Kaplan said, and “by framing the subpoena as broadly as it did, it took its chances” that the court would throw out the subpoenas. “Nor did [Chevron] seek to modify its first subpoena … despite the approach and then expiration of the deadline for the service of documents requests in this action and despite earlier litigation in this Court concerning the timeliness of the service of the first subpoena on Amazon Watch.” 

Chevron has played dirty, manipulating the discovery . . .

Who's in whose "deep pockets"?

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel this week, there is a lot to feel angry about, and yes, there are ambiguities.  The legal blogosphere has been buzzing, and while there are many different takes on what it all means, most people agree on a few things—the decision overall was a blow to human rights, and more generally, the Supreme Court has raised more questions than answers.  We’ll be litigating the details for quite a while.  

SCOTUSblog has a good collection of legal analysis, including ERI’s initial reaction, and the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre has compiled a number of responses as well.

The range of opinions there and elsewhere is wide—however, perhaps none are more offensive or ridiculous than corporate defense counsel Kristin Linsley Myles’s characterization of the ATS in her post on SCOTUSblog (emphasis added):

The ATS was a largely neglected jurisdictional statute until the Second Circuit’s decision in 1980 in Filartiga v. Peńa-Irala, but since then, increasingly has been used to target deep-pocket corporate defendants with allegations that they aided and abetted human rights violations by foreign governments. The Court’s decision is likely to put a stop to these cases, particularly where, as in Kiobel, neither the events at issue nor the parties to the case have any connection to the United States.

In the interest of full disclosure, Kristin Linsley Myles was one of the lawyers who represented Unocal in ERI’s case Doe v. Unocal, so there’s some history between us.  She and her co-counsel had no problem lining their own pockets defending the oil company against allegations of forced labor, torture, rape and extrajudicial killing in connection with their gas pipeline in Myanmar (Burma).  Our clients suffered unspeakable violence at the hands of her clients, and then risked . . .

Subscribe to Legal