Blog de Alek Nomi

Burma’s President, Thein Sein, today sent a letter to Burma's parliament suspending construction of the Chinese-backed US$ 3.6 billion Myitsone Dam on the Irrawaddy River. This surprising announcement, if enforced, marks a major achievement for Burma’s civil society and local communities in Kachin State that have consistently opposed the construction of the Myitsone Dam because of its expected negative environmental and social impacts.

In May 2007, China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) signed an agreement with Burma’s government for the construction of seven dams on the Irrawaddy, N’Mai Hka, and Mali Hka Rivers in Kachin State, at a total cost of approximately US$ 20 billion.  At 152 meters high, the 6,000 MW Myitsone dam is the largest of these seven planned dams and, according to Burma Rivers Network, the construction of the Myitsone Dam will “impact millions of people downstream who depend on the Irrawaddy for agriculture, fishing, and transportation.  The dam will also destroy…one of the most significant cultural heritage sites for the Kachin people and an important landmark for all of Burma.”

Earlier this year, a controversial environmental impact assessment (EIA) conducted by CPI concluded “there is no need for such a big dam to be constructed at the confluence of the Irrawaddy River.” Civil society and local community opposition to the Myitsone Dam has crystallized over recent months, and pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been vocal in her criticism of the dam project and the importance of protecting the Irrawaddy River. 

On Tuesday August 23rd, Peru's congress unanimously approved a new law that would grant indigenous communities the right to prior consultation on projects that will affect them and their lands. The approval of the Law on Prior Consultation with Indigenous Communities (Ley de Derecho a la Consulta Previa a los Pueblos Indígenas) marks a historic step in Peru's recognition of indigenous rights and the integration of indigenous communities into the decision-making process for large-scale natural resource development projects.

In recent years, Peru's government has faced serious conflict with indigenous communities, particularly from the country's vast Amazonian region, over extractive projects in the oil, gas, mining, and logging sectors. Two years ago, in June 2009, more than 30 people were killed in the northern Amazon province of Bagua when Peruvian security forces violently clashed with indigenous communities protesting new legislative decrees that aimed to open up their lands to increased oil, gas, mining and hydropower development, without requiring prior consultations with indigenous communities. Ultimately these legislative decrees were overturned, but with nearly 75 percent of the Peruvian Amazon already carved into oil and natural gas blocks, the conflict and debate over the use of the country's natural resources has continued.

Commenting on the Law on Prior Consultation with Indigenous Communities, Alberto Pizango Chota, President of the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana) (AIDESEP), stated that Peru's "indigenous peoples only demand respect for the right to a dignified life and this approval signifies a demonstrated willingness of the government to follow through with the great changes the country needs…and continue promoting the harmonious development of the country" (translation mine).

A few months ago, I blogged about South Sudan’s independence referendum and future implications for the country’s oil reserves. With the vast majority of South Sudan voting for independence from Khartoum, the establishment of South Sudan as an independent country has been slated for July 2011; however, many issues remain unresolved as to how the country will divide in two.

So far, no definitive agreement has been reached between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan on the future division of oil revenues, which could have significant economic implications for both countries. The land-locked south has large oil reserves, but the oil can currently only be exported via the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, which travels 1,600 km through the north before reaching Port Sudan where it is exported overseas. At present, Sudan and South Sudan split the oil revenues equally (although the South claims Khartoum has been taking more than its fair share), but this agreement will likely change after July when South Sudan becomes formally independent.

Looking forward, options for Sudan and South Sudan include (1) continuing to split oil revenues; (2) South Sudan paying a transportation fee to Sudan for the continued use of the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline; or (3) the construction of a new pipeline from South Sudan through neighboring Kenya. With tensions running high as July draws nearer, both Sudan and South Sudan are aware of the economic implications of such revenue sharing agreements, as is China National Petroleum Corporation, which operates several blocks in South Sudan as well as the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline.

In recent weeks, relations between Sudan and South Sudan have been particularly strained since the north seized the disputed oil-rich region of Abyei, which straddles the border between both countries. The UNHCR estimates that 100,000 people have already been displaced by this latest conflict in Abyei, which is likely to further sour future negotiations between both countries over the partition of oil revenues.

Recently, I watched the new documentary Bajo el Cielo Amazónico (Under the Amazon Sky), which takes a critical look at the social, environmental, and economic impacts of the logging industry in the Ucayali region of the Peruvian Amazon. The film focuses on Ashaninka communities from along the Tamaya River, and takes issue with many aspects of natural resource extraction on indigenous territories in the Amazon, including:

• The social and environmental impacts of logging and deforestation
• The ‘invisibility’ of indigenous communities without land titles or ID cards.
• Poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth between companies and local communities
• The irrationality of sustainable natural resource extraction
• Unfair labor practices and the withholding of salaries
• Access to education and health care

In approaching these issues, the film strives to raise the voices of local communities affected by logging, mining and oil exploitation by having them tell their own stories, following a similar tradition to Una Muerte en Sión (A Death in Zion) and La Voz de los Apus (The Voice of the Apus).

The concerns about natural resource development on indigenous territories raised in each of these three movies are especially relevant today as the Peruvian Amazon continues to face increasing environmental and social challenges. Within just the last month, the Peruvian government passed Emergency Decrees 001-2011 and 002-2011 which aim to increase foreign investment by eliminating the requirement for environmental impact assessments (EIA) for more than 30 large-scale development projects, including several hydropower dams and transportation and trade corridors.

This has been a historic month for Sudan and Burma, two countries with significant and controversial investment from China in their petroleum sectors. In the past, many parallels have been drawn between Sudan and Burma as both countries are culturally diverse, rich in fossil fuels, and share similar histories including a colonial legacy, decades of armed conflict and civil war, widespread human rights abuses, and economic sanctions imposed by the West. However, with recent national elections in Burma and the independence referendum in South Sudan, both countries are entering new phases of political transition, which raises questions about the future and security of China’s investments in oil, natural gas, and pipeline projects in Sudan and Burma.

In South Sudan, the result of last month’s referendum was officially announced last week, with an overwhelming 98% of the population voting for independence from the north. Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir has publicly accepted the result of the referendum, but many questions remain unanswered about the future of Sudan and South Sudan’s vast oil reserves; how oil revenues will be divided, and the operation of the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, which spans 1,600 km from oilfields in the south to Port Sudan in the north. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) operates the pipeline and has significant investments in South Sudan’s oilfields, but all the contracts have been negotiated with the government in the northern capital of Khartoum. Prior to the referendum, representatives of the semi-autonomous government of South Sudan called for a renegotiation of all oil contracts, but just a few weeks ago southern oil minister Garang Diing announced that South Sudan “will respect all our contracts signed before the (2005) peace agreement.” Still, CNPC signed several agreements after 2005 and the uncertainty about these investments in South Sudan has led the Chinese government and CNPC to launch a charm offensive to keep the oil flowing.

October has been a tough month for the Peruvian Amazon as the government continues to open up the jungle to increased hydrocarbon exploitation, and communities in areas already under exploitation continue to suffer from oil spills and environmental contamination. 

Most recently, more than four thousand inhabitants from communities living along the Marañón River in the northern Peruvian Amazon blocked the river this week in protest of severe contamination caused by an oil spill in June that leaked three hundred barrels of oil into the water.  More than ten thousand people have been affected by this spill, and local communities claim that the company responsible for the spill, Pluspetrol, is indifferent to the quality of life of people where they operate.  Local communities point to the fact that Pluspetrol even stopped supplying clean food, water and medicine to affected communities after just a few days claiming the problem had already been solved, even though recent water quality tests show pollutants clearly exceeding the national environmental standards.      

Similar criticisms of Pluspetrol are echoed by indigenous communities in other areas of the Peruvian Amazon where the company operates.  In Block 1AB, for example, Achuar communities along the Corrientes River continue to witness oil spills and suffer from diseases caused by lead and cadmium poisoning in their waters.  Even today, communities along the Corrientes River continue to use contaminated water for cooking and bathing, and accuse Pluspetrol of negligence, violating their rights, and showing indifference to their wellbeing.

Last week I blogged about recent advances in the construction of the China-Burma crude oil and natural gas pipelines made public during Burmese leader Than Shwe’s state visit to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and other leaders.

Although only a week has passed since posting that blog, some interesting new information about China-Burma relations has been published, including an article by the Irrawaddy that claims that during Than Shwe’s trip to Beijing, China agreed to provide Burma with a US$ 4.2 billion interest-free loan.  The article quotes an official from Burma’s Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development as saying “the 30-year loan is intended to help fund mass hydropower projects, road construction, railway development and information technology development.”  If this report is correct, the size of this loan is several times larger than previous ones China has given Burma, and raises serious concerns about the human rights violations – like forced labor, land confiscation, and livelihood destruction – that local communities will have to confront if such ample funding for the construction of new energy and infrastructure development projects is made available.

Also released this past week was a new report from International Crisis Group (ICG) on China’s relationship with Burma, which highlights Chinese investment, the ethnic politics in border areas, and Burma’s upcoming elections.  This report identifies several Chinese-backed energy development and infrastructure projects, including the China-Burma crude oil and natural gas pipelines, and illuminates the social, political and economic complexities of China’s growing investment in Burma.  Particularly of interest in this report are the interviews from along the China-Burma border which give perspective to China’s dual engagement with ethnic cease-fire groups and the government in Naypyidaw, as well as the sometimes divergent interests of the governments of neighboring Yunnan Province and distant Beijing.

On September 10th, Burmese leader Senior General Than Shwe met with Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao in Beijing.  During the high profile meetings, leaders from both countries affirmed the strength of the brotherly paukphaw relations China and Burma share and discussed the importance of maintaining peace along their borders, as well as ways to increase economic and trade exchanges, especially in the development of energy projects.

The following day, state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) held an opening ceremony to begin construction on the Chinese portion of two controversial crude oil and natural gas pipelines linking Burma’s Arakan coast with China’s southwestern city of Kunming.  These pipelines will transport natural gas from Burma’s lucrative offshore Shwe project to refineries in China, as well as China’s imports of crude oil from the Middle East, Africa and South America, thereby facilitating China’s access to overseas energy resources and promoting western China’s economic and industrial development.    

The announcement that CNPC was beginning construction on the Chinese portion of these pipelines comes less than three months after construction started on the Burmese portion of the pipelines.  That last announcement in June also coincided with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s official visit to Burma to celebrate the 60^th anniversary of Sino-Burmese relations. 

Once completed, these pipelines will stretch from the coastal town of Kyaukpyu in Arakan State to the town of Shweli on the China border in Shan State before continuing on to other Chinese cities for processing.  And, while these oil and gas pipelines are a huge endeavor, they are also part of a larger project to establish a trade and transportation corridor linking China with the Indian Ocean.  New roads are being built and railroad tracks being laid to improve transportation between Kyaukpyu and the China border to provide China with secure access to the Indian Ocean.    

I recently returned to Thailand from Peru, where I had the opportunity to travel deep into the Amazon to the remote cities of Pucallpa and Iquitos.  For two weeks I, and several colleagues from our Washington DC office, met with Peruvian lawyers, anthropologists, activists, and leaders of Amazonian indigenous federations to listen to their stories, learn about their work, and gain a deeper understanding of Peru’s indigenous, human rights and environmental movements. 

Sunset over the Rio Ucayali

I've had lifelong ties with Peru and its people, but every visit still teaches me something new and deepens my connection with the country.  I’ve learned about the intricate cosmologies of some of the region’s diverse ethnic groups, and I've seen firsthand the cultural, environmental and health effects the oil, gas, mining and logging industries have had on Amazonian communities.  During this latest visit I was especially impressed by how committed the communities and civil society of the Amazon region are to preserving local knowledge, traditions and beliefs while pursuing sustainable and equitable models of development. 

I was also impressed by the optimism we encountered, especially because my previous trip to Peru had been quite different.  Last year I was in Lima when communities throughout the Peruvian Amazon rose up to protest new laws that aimed to open up the region to increased mining, oil, natural gas and hydropower development, with little benefit to local communities.  I had been waiting to travel to Iquitos for two months while these communities sent a strong message to the rest of the country by cutting it off from their jungle resources by barricading roads, blocking waterways, and shutting down an oil pipeline.  These protests culminated in the violent clash between police and indigenous protesters on a highway in Bagua Province which resulted in numerous death and injuries on both sides, and shocked the rest of the country.

Earlier this month, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao traveled to Burma to meet with Prime Minister U Thein Sein and celebrate the 60th anniversary of Sino-Burmese diplomatic relations.  Over the last six decades, relations between China and Burma have varied greatly, ranging from the initial suspicious and mistrustful perceptions of each other in the 1950s to the strong “pauk pauw” (fraternal) relations China and Burma currently share.  In recent years, growing Chinese investment in Burma has only strengthened relations between the two countries.  For Burma’s military junta, maintaining good relations with a powerful and rich neighbor with UN Security Council veto power is extremely valuable; while for China, Burma is a strategic geopolitical ally for maintaining the stability of its border areas, securing access to natural resources for its western provinces, as well as providing trade and transportation access to the Indian Ocean, especially as construction begins on dual oil and natural gas pipelines linking Burma’s Arakan coast with China’s southwest Yunnan province. 

We documented China’s investment in the development of Burma’s natural resources in a 2008 report which identifies 69 Chinese companies involved in at least 90 hydropower, oil and natural gas and mining projects in Burma.  Given China’s vast investments in the development of Burma’s natural resources it comes as no surprise that during the one day celebration of the 60th anniversary of Sino-Burmese diplomatic relation, Premier Wen Jiabao and Prime Minister U Thein Sein were present for the signing of a new deal (in English; also available in Chinese) between China North Industries Co (NORINCO), a Chinese state-owned weapons and armament manufacturer, and Burma’s military junta for the Monywa Copper Project – a project which not only provides China with access to raw materials, but increases China’s growing influence in Burma.

According to the Chinese company NORINCO’s website, “Monywa…is abundant in copper mine resources with excellent mineral quality, which is of great significance to strengthening the strategic reserves of copper resources in our country, and to enhancing the influence of our country in Myanmar.”